




Stranger in a Changed Land

International Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security
March 2022

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The Long and Winding Road....



Seismic Shifts

- Communications Security → “Cyber”
- Mathematics → CS, Networking, Analytics
- Technology → Information, Operations
- Government monopoly → user/market driven
- “Control Model” of security → open market
- National Security → economic/social Risk

A few lessons

- Knowing about flaws doesn't get them fixed
- In Cyberspace, we all have more in common than different
- The Bad Guy doesn't perform magic
 - and most attacks are repeats of a pattern
- There's a large but limited number of defensive choices
 - and the 80/20 rule applies (The Pareto Principle)
- Cyber Defense is really Information Management
 - and when you see "*share*", replace with "*translate*" and "*execute*"
- Cybersecurity is not an event, a tool, or training – it's a machine
 - fueled by information
 - the optimal place to solve a security problem is *not* where you found it


The National Security Agency (NSA)

Never Say Anything? Not Seen Anywhere? Needs Scant Attention?

- Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)
- Cybersecurity (from COMSEC, INFOSEC, Information Assurance...)

Offense + Defense = ???

The National Security Agency (NSA)



- Resources
- Culture
- Recognition
- Leadership Attention


*Defense wins games,
Offense wins budgets!*

Offense + Defense =?

- Cross-training
- Access to resources (financial, technology, think-tanks...)
- Linkage to the ecosystem (Industry, Policy-Makers, Academia)
- World-wide insight
- Embedded in a highly complex infrastructure

A Cyberdefense OODA Loop


(“Patch Tuesday”)




“Dueling OODAs”

(and the role of Threat Intelligence, Analytics)

- There are many loops, often connected
- “farther in space, earlier in time”
- The Bad Guy’s loop is an opportunity





How Much Should I Care?


Weakness

Flaw


Vulnerability

Exploit

Attack



How Much Should I Care?



WHAT YOU SHOULD KNOW	WHAT DOES IT MEAN?
<i>Anyone in organized crime (or espionage) who is not in this (cyber) ought to be sued for malpractice</i>	The Bad Guys are highly motivated
Almost all attacks are repeats of a type or class; Bad Guys do not perform <i>magic</i>	Build a foundation before taking a “moonshot”; understand the types, classes, patterns of attackers
Just pointing out problems doesn’t get them fixed	Solutions are part of a complex system of feedback, incentives, and verification
It’s hard to have a unique problem or an original thought	Point to existing standards, ideas, frameworks
No security snapshot will work; trust is dynamic	Encourage machinery, not reports; measurement, not a state (of security); good IT and Ops management
Threat Sharing is over-rated	Focus on <i>translation, action</i> , efficiency, info management
Not every problem can be solved in the cyber domain	Diplomacy, economics, policy, social norms
Everyone’s role is changing (industry, government, academia, non-profits, standards)	Less control, more about behavior; less central and top- down, more cooperative
We need better components	Software quality, architectures, services



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